Debate between Dan Demetriou (Philosophy, Minnesota Morris) and Michael Huemer (Philosophy, Colorado), forthcoming in Problems in Applied Ethics: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates, Steven Cowan, ed. (Bloomsbury). The main essays are 5000 words or fewer; replies are 1500 words or fewer. This penultimate version is published here with permission from the editor.

Peter van Inwagen has presented a compelling argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism, which he calls “the Consequence Argument.” This argument depends on a controversial inference rule, “rule beta,” which says.

Mythos und Neue Musik' erforscht erstmalig die spannende Beziehung zwischen den antiken Mythen und der Musik. Birgit Johanna Wertenson widmet sich vor allem zeitgenössischen Kompositionen und weist über die beiden Figuren Orpheus und Kassandra anschaulich nach, dass die Beschäftigung mit dem Mythos auch heute eine komplexe Auseinandersetzung mit elementaren Lebensfragen des Menschen bedeutet. Da die archaischen Figuren stets neue Rezeptionen herausfordern, bleibt der Mythos als Ort kulturellen Wissens aktuell. Das Buch widmet sich dem Thema über einen Dialog aus Philosophie, (...) Kultur- und Musikwissenschaft: Damit wird nicht zuletzt das mittlerweile unübersichtliche Dickicht aus Mythosbegriffen durchdrungen und eine klare Terminologie gewonnen, die auch für andere Kulturwissenschaften eine Basis zum Umgang mit dem Mythos liefern kann. (shrink)

This book develops and defends a version of direct realism: the thesis that perception gives us direct awareness, and non-inferential knowledge, of the external..

both the initial justification for adopting it and the justification for retaining it provided by seeming memories. This view captures our intuitions about justification in several cases, while none of the alternative views can.

I defend the principle of Phenomenal Conservatism, on which appearances of all kinds generate at least some justification for belief. I argue that there is no reason for privileging introspection or intuition over perceptual experience as a source of justified belief; that those who deny Phenomenal Conservatism are in a self-defeating position, in that their view cannot be both true and justified; and that thedemand for a metajustification for Phenomenal Conservatism either is an easily met demand, or is an unfair (...) or question-begging one. (shrink)

3.1. Why logic is a priori. 3.2. Why mathematics is a priori. 3.3. Why ethics is a priori. 3.4. The nature of a priori knowledge - Acquired through the faculty of reason; knowledge of universals. 4. Universals 4.1. What are they? - "universal" & "particular" defined 4.2. The (real) problem of universals - "nominalism" & "realism" defined; why these are the only two possible positions. 4.3. Rand the realist - why Rand must be a realist, whether she knows it or (...) not 5. More on ethics: 5.1. The value of life - the need (and lack) of a proof that life is good in the Objectivist ethics. 5.2. Rand's derivation (?) of egoism - How not to argue for egoism. 5.3. Is egoism self-evident? - The need for arguments for or against egoism. (shrink)

The exhibition Critical Zones – Horizonte einer neuen Erdpolitik (2020–2022) at the ZKM Karlsruhe is a renewed attempt to unite artistic, philosophical, and scientific knowledge production in the medium of the ›Gedankenausstellung‹ (thought exhibition). The thematic orientation of the exhibition draws upon the writings of Bruno Latour, one of the curators. The article analyzes how his research on the critical zone, the terrestrial, and the Gaia hypothesis has been transformed into an exhibition format, intending a transmedial spatialization of thoughts combined (...) with the visitor’s experience ›how to land on earth‹. Based on a detailed exhibition analysis, it examines the curation and mediation of Latour’s earth-political thoughts and concepts in both the physical exhibition and the digital exhibition platform that evolved in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. (shrink)

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.

Technological innovations such as next generation sequencing and DNA hybridisation enrichment have resulted in multi‐fold increases in both the quantity of ancient DNA sequence data and the time depth for DNA retrieval. To date, over 30 ancient genomes have been sequenced, moving from 0.7× coverage (mammoth) in 2008 to more than 50× coverage (Neanderthal) in 2014. Studies of rapid evolutionary changes, such as the evolution and spread of pathogens and the genetic responses of hosts, or the genetics of domestication and (...) climatic adaptation, are developing swiftly and the importance of palaeogenomics for investigating evolutionary processes during the last million years is likely to increase considerably. However, these new datasets require new methods of data processing and analysis, as well as conceptual changes in interpreting the results. In this review we highlight important areas of future technical and conceptual progress and discuss research topics in the rapidly growing field of palaeogenomics. -/- . (shrink)

Gedankenexperimente haben im Laufe der Jahrtausende eine entscheidende Rolle als Mittel der Wahl sowohl in der Philosophie als auch in der Naturwissenschaft gespielt. Im Gegensatz zu echten Experimenten kann im "gedanklichen Labor" auch Fragen nachgegangen werden, die man sonst nicht empirisch untersuchen kann. Gedankenexperimente lösen damit zwar sicher nicht die akuten Probleme der Menschheit, aber sie zeigen auf, wie schon leichte Veränderungen der Perspektive oder alltäglicher Grundannahmen zu verblüffenden Lösungen oder zu ganz neuen, spannenden Fragen führen können. Dieses Buch nimmt (...) den Leser mit auf eine Reise durch alle Epochen philosophischen Denkens und stellt, in prägnanter Auflistung von A bis Z, 26 besonders interessante Gedankenexperimente berühmter Philosophen vor. Durchaus anspruchsvoll, aber doch sehr unterhaltsam geschrieben, lädt es nicht nur zum Lesen, sondern vor allem zum Miträtseln und philosophieren ein. Anschauliche, teils auch abwegige Beispiele aus den unterschiedlichsten Gebieten der Wissenschaft lassen keine Langweile aufkommen. Dazu gibt es Hinweise zur Durchführung eigener Gedankenexperimente und kurze Erläuterungen zu den wichtigsten der angeführten Denker von Aristoteles bis Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Sind Jungen die neuen Bildungsverlierer? Werden die Deutschen immer dümmer? Hat PISA die Schulen besser gemacht?Entscheiden sich die Richtigen für ein Lehramtsstudium? Diese und weitere Themen sind gesellschaftlich hoch relevant. Täglich berichten Medien über Bildung - mal mehr, mal weniger fundiert. Oft wird dabei ein überpointiertes, verzerrtes Bild gezeichnet, so dass es schwer ist, sich eine eigene Meinung zu bilden. Das vorliegende Buch greift aktuelle Themen aus Bildungsforschung und Bildungspraxis auf und stellt in kurzer, übersichtlicher Form den Forschungsstand dar. Sie (...) lernen nicht nur die Fakten, sondern auch die Personen kennen, die sich diesen Fragen in Forschung und Praxis widmen. Zu diesem Zweck wurden Interviews mit Expertinnen und Experten geführt, die in diesem Buch nachzulesen sind, aber auch als Videos angeschaut werden können. Zu Wort kommen führende Bildungsforscherinnen und –forscher aus Psychologie, Erziehungswissenschaft, Soziologie und Bildungsökonomie. Zielgruppe Das Buch kann von allen mit Gewinn gelesen werden, die sich für Bildung interessieren. Studierende verschiedener Fachrichtungen, Referendarinnen und Referendare sowie Lehrerinnen und Lehrer finden in diesem Buch viele Themen, die ihre Arbeit direkt betreffen. Die Lektüre kann auch Grundlage für eine Seminargestaltung in Fächern sein, die sich mit Bildungsforschung beschäftigen (Psychologie, Erziehungswissenschaft, Soziologie, Bildungsökonomie, Empirische Bildungsforschung etc.). Durch den Interview-Stil ist das Buch angenehm zu lesen und daher auch als Freizeitlektüre geeignet. (shrink)

Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.

What gives some people the right to issue commands to everyone else and force everyone else to obey them? And why should people obey the commands of those with political power? These two key questions are the heart of the issue of political authority, and, in this volume, two philosophers debate the answers. Michael Huemer argues that political authority is an illusion and that no one is entitled to rule over anyone. He discusses and rebuts the major theories supporting (...) political authority's rightfulness: implicit social contract theory, hypothetical contract theories, democratic theories of authority, and utilitarian theories. Daniel Layman argues that democratic governments have authority because they are needed to protect our rights and because they are accountable to the people. Each author writes two replies directly addressing the arguments and ideas of the other. Key Features Covers a key foundational problem of political philosophy: the authority of government. Debate format ensures a full hearing of both sides. A Glossary includes key concepts in political philosophy related to the issue of authority. Annotated Further Reading sections point students to additional resources. Clear, concrete examples and arguments help students clearly see both sides of the argument. A Foreword by Matt Zwolinski describes a broader context for political authority and then traces the key points and turns in the authors' debate. (shrink)

Through the work of philosophers like Sellars, Davidson and McDowell, the question of how the mind is related to the world has gained new importance in contemporary analytic philosophy. This book demonstrates that Husserl's phenomenological analyses of the structure of consciousness can provide fruitful insights for developing an original approach to these questions.

Recently, the debate on human enhancement has shifted from familiar topics like cognitive enhancement and mood enhancement to a new and – to no one's surprise – controversial subject, namely moral enhancement. Some proponents from the transhumanist camp allude to the ‘urgent need’ of improving the moral conduct of humankind in the face of ever growing technological progress and the substantial dangers entailed in this enterprise. Other thinkers express more sceptical views about this proposal. As the debate has revealed so (...) far, there is no shared opinion among philosophers about the meaning, prospects, and ethical evaluation of moral enhancement. In this article I will address several conceptual and practical problems of this issue, in order to encourage discussion about the prospects of moral enhancement in the future. My assumption is that for the short term, there is little chance of arriving at an agreement on the proper understanding of morality and the appropriateness of one single ethical theory; apart from this, there are further philosophical puzzles loosely referred to in the debate which add to theoretical confusion; and even if these conceptual problems could be solved, there are still practical problems to be smoothed out if moral enhancement is ever to gain relevance apart from merely theoretical interest. My tentative conclusion, therefore, will be that moral enhancement is not very likely to be made sense of – let alone realized – in the medium-term future. (shrink)

Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity (...) has no evidential value. (shrink)

America’s legal system harbors serious, widespread injustices. Many defendants are sent to prison for nonviolent offenses, including many victimless crimes. Convicts often serve draconian sentences in crowded prisons rife with abuse. Almost all defendants are convicted without trial because prosecutors threaten defendants with drastically higher sentences if they request a trial. Most Americans are terrified of encountering any kind of legal trouble, knowing that both civil and criminal courts are extremely slow, unreliable, and expensive to use. This book explores the (...) largest injustices in the legal system and what can be done about them. Besides proposing institutional reforms, the author argues that prosecutors, judges, lawyers, and jury members ought to place justice before the law – for example, by refusing to enforce unjust laws or impose unjust sentences. Issues addressed include: · The philosophical basis for judgments about rights and justice · The problems of overcriminalization and mass incarceration · Abuse of power by police and prosecutors · The injustice of plea bargaining · The appropriateness of jury nullification · The authority of the law, or the lack thereof Justice Before the Law is essential reading for everyone interested in legal ethics, the rule of law, and criminal justice. It is also ideal for students of legal philosophy. (shrink)

I defend the 'Repugnant' Conclusion that for any possible population of happy people, a population containing a sufficient number of people with lives barely worth living would be better. Four lines of argument converge on this conclusion, and the conclusion has a simple, natural theoretical explanation. The opposition to the Repugnant Conclusion rests on a bare appeal to intuition. This intuition is open to charges of being influenced by multiple distorting factors. Several theories of population ethics have been devised to (...) avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, but each generates even more counterintuitive consequences. The intuition opposing the Repugnant Conclusion is thus among the best candidates for an intuition that should be revised. (shrink)

This introduction elaborates how the relationship between religion and light can and should be addressed as a key theme for the critical study of religion. It synthesizes the principal arguments of the six articles collected in this special journal issue and locates them in a broader theoretical framework, focussing especially on the politics of knowledge production.

I address Walter Block’s recent criticisms of my book, Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism. Methodologically, Block relies too much on appeals to contentious and extreme assumptions. Substantively, most of his objections are irrelevant to the central issue of the book. Those that are relevant turn on false assumptions or lead to absurd consequences. In the end, Block’s claim to oppose suffering cannot be reconciled with his indifference to a practice that probably causes, every few years, more suffering than all the suffering (...) in human history. (shrink)

You pass an electron through an inhomogeneous magnetic field (this is produced by a type of magnet, but don’t worry about the details). The field causes the electron to swerve. It is found that all electrons swerve by the same amount, and half of them swerve up, while the other half swerve down. See a video illustration of this.

I argue that, given evidence of the factors that tend to distort our intuitions, ethical intuitionists should disown a wide range of common moral intuitions, and that they should typically give preference to abstract, formal intuitions over more substantive ethical intuitions. In place of the common sense morality with which intuitionism has traditionally allied, the suggested approach may lead to a highly revisionary normative ethics.

The concept of “self-awareness” ( svasaṃvedana ) enters Buddhist epistemological discourse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya and - vṛtti by Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition. Though some of the key passages have already been dealt with in various publications, no attempt has been made to comprehensively examine all of them as a whole. A close reading is here proposed to make up for this deficit. In connection with a particularly difficult passage (PS(V) 1.8cd-10) that presents the means (...) of valid cognition and its result ( pramāṇa/pramāṇaphala ), a new interpretation is suggested, inspired by the commentary of Jinendrabuddhi. This interpretation highlights an aspect of selfawareness that has hitherto not been claimed for Dignāga: self-awareness offers essentially subjective access to one’s own mental states and factors. (shrink)

Looking times and gaze behavior indicate that infants can predict the goal state of an observed simple action event (e.g., object‐directed grasping) already in the first year of life. The present paper mainly focuses on infants’ predictive gaze‐shifts toward the goal of an ongoing action. For this, infants need to generate a forward model of the to‐be‐obtained goal state and to disengage their gaze from the moving agent at a time when information about the action event is still incomplete. By (...) about 6 months of age, infants show goal‐predictive gaze‐shifts, but mainly for familiar actions that they can perform themselves (e.g., grasping) and for familiar agents (e.g., a human hand). Therefore, some theoretical models have highlighted close relations between infants’ ability for action‐goal prediction and their motor development and/or emerging action experience. Recent research indicates that infants can also predict action goals of familiar simple actions performed by non‐human agents (e.g., object‐directed grasping by a mechanical claw) when these agents display agency cues, such as self‐propelled movement, equifinality of goal approach, or production of a salient action effect. This paper provides a review on relevant findings and theoretical models, and proposes that the impacts of action experience and of agency cues can be explained from an action‐event perspective. In particular, infants’ goal‐predictive gaze‐shifts are seen as resulting from an interplay between bottom‐up processing of perceptual information and top‐down influences exerted by event schemata that store information about previously executed or observed actions. (shrink)

This paper will focus on my conception of the nature of morality, which I call intuitionism. My conception is inspired in large part by earlier intuitionists (Moore, Ross, and Prichard), though I do not claim they would all agree exactly with everything I say.

In _The Mind and its Place in Nature_ , C.D. Broad tries to show, as he says (p. 59), that "there is no doubt" that the Theory of Emergence is a logically possible view with a good deal in its favor. And in his history of British Emergentism, McLaughlin states that emergentism is perfectly internally coherent, although he doesn't think it has any empirical evidence in its favor at present. I am inclined to agree with the assessment that emergentism is (...) a coherent theory, but I can't see that Broad or McLaughlin has shown this, at least if this is taken to mean that it represents a metaphysical possibility (and not merely is not self-contradictory). Moreover, I suspect many people find the concept of emergent properties somehow unscientific, mysterious, and possibly incoherent; and I doubt that Broad has adequately addressed this intuition. He has indeed admirably explicated the meaning of the theory, so that now we can all understand it; but just as even to explain the idea, for example, that there are alterations without causes in such a way that it becomes absolutely, crystal clear what one means by "an uncaused change" would not be to demonstrate. (shrink)